The first rule of Site R is: You do not talk about Site R. Or, as the security guidance about the Pentagon’s nuclear war bunker (AKA Raven Rock Mountain Complex, or RRMC), states: “Avoid conversations about RRMC with unauthorized personnel.” The other two rules of Site R are: “Do not confirm or deny information about RRMC to reporters or radio stations,” and “Do not post RRMC information on Internet web pages.”
We might suggest a fourth rule: do not send information about RRMC to reporters working on a travelogue about nuclear weapons.
But our interest in Site R was piqued by an announcement that was posted in 2006 on the website of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Pentagon’s nonproliferation agency:
Raven Rock Military Complex The Hardened Facilities Managers Conference, co-sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Raven Rock Military Complex*, will focus on priority issues of both countering enemy underground facilities (UGF) and protecting friendly underground facilities. Managers of U.S. operated UGF's will provide overviews of their corresponding complexes. In addition technical and vulnerability issues will be discussed and site tours will be provided.
If Site R is so gosh-darn secret, why did they post this notice, and more importantly, how did we get our grubby little mitts on documents relating to this conference, including an an informational overview, a “Welcome Package", an agenda, security guidance for attendees, and a schedule of shuttles to Site R (which we are not posting)? Cunning subterfuge? A Deep Throat inside the mountain? A Freedom of Information Act request?
Sadly, we just asked for them. We e-mailed the contact person for the conference, provided our affiliation, and asked for the conference materials. We did say “please."
All of the information was unclassified, and it provides for us at least a small window into what goes on underground at Site R.
Within a few days, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency had scrubbed the conference posting from their website, and we were informed that the event most certainly was not open to the press. Somewhere inside the halls of DTRA, we suspect someone was being reprimanded.
For all the secrecy surrounding Site R, the mountain facility suffers from the obvious flaw of just about every bunker out there: Its existence isn’t secret, and in the era of Google Earth, it really can’t be kept secret. And if it’s not a secret, what good is it? A modern thermonuclear warhead would destroy it in an instant. In fact, Site R was almost mothballed prior to September 11. As we learned from our travels, bunkers are typically obsolete the day they open their doors, but they live off the inertia of bureaucracy.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 gave new purpose to the Cold War bunker in Pennsylvania, known as the "underground Pentagon," first as the alleged undisclosed location of Vice President Dick Cheney, and then as a base for revitalized “continuity of government” operations.
So, what do bunker managers do at meetings like this? Judging from the conference agenda, they look for things to worry about
: pandemics; electromagnetic pulse weapons; and biological attacks. But as one item on the agenda hinted — “Tunnel Collapse Briefing” — possibly the most dangerous threat to life in the bunker is the bunker itself.
Site R is not secret, but details of what's inside are hidden from view. The agenda provides some hints about what's there: a presidential weather support facility (presumably for Air Force One) and construction related to electromagnetic pulse protection. But perhaps the most eye-catching item on the agenda is a “Gorilla Rock Update” provided by miners, suggesting that there is new construction going on inside the mountain.
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/0...o-visit-a.html